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COMMENTS
PERSONAL MANAGERS AND THE CALIFORNIA
TALENT AGENCIES ACT: FOR WHOM THE
BILL TOILS
I. INTRODUCTION
In August of 1982, the lingering controversy over the role of per-
sonal managers in the entertainment industry was rekindled due to the
amendment of the Talent Agencies Act by the California Legislature.'
This controversy stems from the issue of whether personal managers
should be allowed to solicit employment for artist entertainers without
first obtaining a state license. 2 Prior to the 1982 amendment, any indi-
vidual or corporation engaged in job "procurement" in any field of en-
tertainment was deemed to be acting as a talent agent and was required
to be licensed as such under the Talent Agencies Act.3 In effect, those
personal managers who wished to act as talent agents were required to
be licensed as talent agents. Although personal managers, particularly
in the music industry, are known to procure employment,4 few are li-
censed to do so under the Act, primarily because licensees are subject
1. Act of August 31, 1982, CAL. LAB. CODE ch. 682, §§ 1700.4, 1700.44, 1701-1704. For
the impact of Assembly Bill 997 see, e.g., The Daily Variety, Aug. 30, 1982, at I Col. I and
The Hollywood Reporter, Aug. 11, 1982, at I Col. 2. See generally CAL. LAB. CODE
§§ 1700-1700.46 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1983). For the purposes of this article, the term
"entertainment industry" includes the music, motion picture and television industries.
2. "Artists" are defined in the California Labor Code as: ". . . actors and actresses
rendering services on the legitimate stage and in the production of motion pictures, radio
artists, musical artists, musical organizations, directors of legitimate stage, motion picture
and radio productions, musical directors, writers, cinematographers, composers, lyricists, ar-
rangers, and other artists and persons rendering professional services in motion picture, the-
atrical, radio, television and other entertainment enterprises." CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4
(West Cum. Supp. 1983).
3. Id. § 1700.5. Talent agencies are defined in section 1700.4 of the Labor Code as
follows:
A talent agency is hereby defined to be a person or corporation who engages in the
occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment
or engagements for an artist or artists. Talent agencies may, in addition, counsel or
direct artists in the development of their professional careers.
4. Hurewitz, Personal Managers, U.S.C. ENTERTAINMENT LAW INSTITUTE, SYLLABUS
ON REPRESENTING MUSICAL ARTISTS: LEGAL, BUSINESS AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS 51, 55
(1975); Johnson and Lang, The Personal Manager in the California Entertainment Industry,
52 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 376, 382 (1979). Procuring employment for artists has been charac-
terized as common, even vital to the manager-artist relationship. See Johnson and Lang, id.
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
to various guild and union regulations, some of which interfere with
the standard business practices of many personal managers.5
Severe sanctions have been imposed upon personal managers who
procured employment without a talent agent's license. Typically, the
agreement between the artist and manager was found void and all
commissions received thereunder by the manager, including commis-
sions received for lawful personal management services, were subject to
refund to the artist.6 The Talent Agencies Act had thus become a pow-
erful weapon in the hands of some artists wishing to terminate their
management agreement and receive free management services since
they could do so merely by proving "unlawful procurement".'
The 1982 amendment addresses this situation. The new law in ef-
fect says that persons or corporations shall not be subject to licensing
and regulation under the Talent Agencies Act if their job solicitation
activities are limited to the procurement of recording contracts and the
negotiation of other contracts in conjunction with a licensed talent
agent.' This benefits unlicensed personal managers who can now law-
fully procure employment albeit, if only to a limited degree. But the
victory for personal managers is temporary and limited. Pursuant to a
sunset clause, the enactment will be repealed in January of 1985 unless
a new statute deletes or extends that date.9 In addition, the unlicensed
solicitation, or "booking" of engagements other than recording agree-
ments in the music industry, is not sanctioned by the amendment and
finally, the amendment is not a comprehensive resolution of the myriad
of issues that face personal managers and the entertainment industry in
general.
This article examines these and other potential problems with the
Talent Agencies Act as amended. As most of the original Act remains
Most personal management agreements, however, state that the manager is not licensed and
cannot act as a talent agent. See Hurewitz, supra.
5. Consideration of guilds and unions is limited to the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), The
American Federation of Musicians (AFofM), and the American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists (AFTRA). For a complete discussion of guild and union regulations see
infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 30-54 and accompanying text. Because artists are of the class for
whose benefit the Act was passed, they are not usually considered as being in pari delicto
with the unlicensed artists' manager when a contract is voided. Buchwald v. Superior Court,
254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 351, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1967).
7. For an exhaustive list of cases filed by artists against their personal managers, see
Johnson and Lang, supra note 4 at 389-90 n.94. It should be noted here that artists may
have a valid reason for wanting to terminate their management agreements other than the
simple fact that their manager has unlawfully procured.




intact, and since the amendment deals with concepts, such as "negotia-
tion" and "procurement", which were applied under the original Act,
the workings of the Act prior to the 1982 amendment will first be ex-
amined. Various cases arising under the Act, with an emphasis on
those in which penalties have been imposed on personal managers, will
be analyzed followed by a discussion and analysis of the 1982 amend-
ment itself.
II. TALENT AGENTS AND PERSONAL MANAGERS' °
Personal managers and talent agents perform different services for
their artist-clients but their functions and activities sometimes overlap.
As defined in the Talent Agencies Act, a talent agent primarily pro-
cures employment for artists. I This is particularly true in the fields of
television and motion pictures where talent agents originated.' 2 The
Talent Agencies Act also permits agents to "advise" and "counsel"
their clients,' 3 but their primary function and duty is to find jobs.
In contrast to talent agents, the primary function of a personal
manager is to advise and counsel artists and to coordinate and super-
vise all business aspects of their careers.' 4 Personal managers usually
have smaller client rosters than most agents and therefore often can
give more attention to all the needs of their clients.' 5 Managers give
advice on a variety of matters including publicity, public relations, and
the selection of an artists' material. They may also take part in the
selection and supervision of the artist's agent, attorney and business
10. See generally Hurewitz, supra note 4, at 53-60; Johnson and Lang, supra note 4, at
376-382; The Licensing and Regulation ofArtists Managers, Personal Managers and Musicians
Booking Agencies Before the Cal Senate ComriL on Industrial Relations 60 (Nov. 20, 1975).
(Hereafter cited as Hearings). Statements of Marvin Faris, The Artists Managers Guild,
Roger Davis, The William Morris Agency, Claude McCue, The American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists, Howard Thaler, esq. and Arnold Mills, The Conference of
Personal Managers; and Joe Smith, Warner Bros. Records.
11. See supra note 3.
12. Historically, talent agents have been the dominating force of procurement activity in
the motion picture and television industries, whereas personal managers have essentially
fulfilled this role in the music industry. See Johnson and Lang, supra note 4, at 377-380;
Hurewitz, supra note 4, at 55.
13. See supra note 3.
14. See Johnson and Lang, supra note 4, at 380-81. For a more detailed discussion of
the various services performed by a personal manager, see Hurewitz, supra note 4, at 56-58.
See also, Kronfeld, Margolis and Silfen, Personal Management, Agency, Legal Representa-
tion and Business Management Problems in COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRY 14, 21-2 (1982).
15. Hurewitz, supra note 4 at 54; Shemel and Krasilovsky, This Business of Music at 71-
72 (4th Ed. 3rd Printing 1981). Telephone interview with Pat McQueeney, Conference of
Personal Managers, October 14, 1982.
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manager. Managers are sometimes involved in production and promo-
tional activities concerning the artist and, in the music field, sign musi-
cians to recording or publishing companies owned by the manager.
They may even lend financial support to new artists in order to help
them get started in their careers. 16
Similar to talent agents, some personal managers, procure jobs for
their clients, though they are not licensed to do so and are thus in viola-
tion of California law.'7 This is particularly true in the music industry
where talent agents have not traditionally procured recording agree-
ments with record companies.' 8 Nevertheless unlike talent agents, pro-
curing employment is secondary or "incidental" to the personal
manager's primary duty of coordinating and supervising career activi-
ties.' 9 It may be argued, however, that ultimately, both personal man-
agers and talent agents procure employment and therefore the only real
distinction between these professions, in terms of the Talent Agencies
Act, is that talent agents procure employment lawfully.
III. PROVISIONS AND PROCEDURES UNDER THE ARTISTS'
MANAGERS AND TALENT AGENCIES ACT
The Talent Agencies Act is essentially a 1978 recodification of the
Artists' Managers Act of 1959.20 The statutory provisions in the two
acts are almost identical, the only significant difference being the sub-
stitution of the term "talent agent" or "agency" for "artists' man-
ager."" Therefore, an analysis of the provisions and case history of the
original law is vital in understanding the 1978 and 1982 amendments.22
16. Hurewitz, supra note 4, at 56, 86.
17. See supra note 4.
18. Johnson and Lang, supra note 4 at 382. Talent agents are reluctant to enter into
agreements, with musicians who do not have a recording contract where as personal manag-
ers are more willing to take a chance on new talent by investing time and money.
19. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
20. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.45 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1983) For the legislative
history of The Artists' Managers Act, see Charles, The Personal Manager in Calfornia: Rid-
ing The Horns of the Licensing Dilemma, 1 COMM/ENT 347, 357-58 (1978), see also Johnson
and Lang, supra note 4, at 386-408.
21. As both Acts are nearly identical, references to "the Act" are to both the Artists'
Managers Act and the Talent Agencies Act.
22. It is important to note that cases are still heard under the Artists' Managers Act if the
petition to determine controversy was filed before the statute was amended in 1978. See,
e.g., Pryor v. Franklin, No. TAC 17 MP 114 at 9 n.5 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r. Aug. 12, 1982);
Bank of America v. Fleming, No. 1098 ASC MP-432 at 6 n.2 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Jan. 14,
1982); Mahan v. Kutash, No. AM 8-78 MP-452 at 4 n.l (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Jun. 18, 1981).
In Pryor, the respondent was found to have acted as both an artists' manager and talent
agent because he had negotiated contracts between 1975 and 1980. Pryor, supra at 14-15.
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The Artists' Managers Act was designed to protect artists seeking
employment by licensing and regulating artists' managers.23 Article
One of the Act deals generally with scope and definitions; Article Two
pertains to licensing procedures including matters relating to applica-
tions, renewals, filing fees, the posting of bonds and license revoca-
24tion. Article Three, entitled "Operation and Management", generally
pertains to such matters as the approval of artists' managers contracts
by the Labor Commissioner, fee schedules, the keeping of books and
records, and the regulation of employment practices.25
Proceedings under the Act are commenced by filing a "Petition to
Determine Controversy" with the California Labor Commissioner's of-
fice. 26 A copy of the petition is served on the opposing party, who must
then serve and file an answer within 10 days.27 Section 1700.44 of Arti-
cle Three gives the Labor Commissioner original and exclusive juris-
diction to decide cases arising under the Act. 28 This section specifically
provides that controversies are to be heard and determined by the La-
bor Commissioner subject to appeal de novo in superior court.29
Notwithstanding section 1700.44, section 1700.45 states that the artists'
manager's contract may contain provisions for the arbitration of dis-
putes arising out of that contract.
IV. DECISIONAL LAW CONSTRUING THE ARTISTS' MANAGERS AND
TALENT AGENCIES ACT
The most celebrated case arising under the Artists' Managers Act
23. Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 350, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1967).
For a full discussion of the history of this case see supra notes 30-49 and accompanying text.
24. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.5-1700.22 (West 1971); See also CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8,
R.70 §§ 12000.1 - 12000.9, 12005 (1970).
25. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.23-1700.46; See also CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, R.70
§ 12001 - 12004 (1970).
26. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, R.70 § 12022 (1970). For the proper form of the petition
as well as required documents for filing, See id. §§ 12022.1, 12023.
27. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, R.70 §§ 12024, 12025, 12032 (1970).
28. Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 359, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1967).
The hearing officers in the Labor Commissioner's office make the initial determination of
whether they have jurisdiction to hear a case. See, e.g., McFadden v. Ripp, No. SFMP 71
TAC 7-80 at 5 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Apr. 17, 1981). This determination is based on whether
the petitioner is an "artist" and whether the respondent acted as an "artists' manager" or
"talent agent" as those terms are defined in Section 1700.4 of the Act. See, e.g., Fischer v.
Shepard, No. AMC 7-78 MP 453 at 2 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Jan. 23, 1981).
29. See also, Buchwald v. Katz, 8 Cal. 3d 493, 502, 503 P.2d 1376, 105 Cal. Rptr. 368
(1972). The Labor Commissioner's determinations, such as those cited in supra note 28, are
unpublished and can only be obtained by request from the Department of Industrial Rela-
tions, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement.
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is Buchwald v. Superior Court,30 a dispute involving the then named
rock group The Jefferson Airplane ("The Airplane") and their manager
Matthew Katz. This case examined important questions concerning
the jurisdiction and scope of the Act. In Buchwald, Katz entered into
identical contracts with each member of The Airplane in which he
agreed to act as the group's "personal representative, advisor and man-
ager in the entertainment field."'' 3 The contracts also contained a pro-
vision stating that Katz had not offered to obtain employment or
engagements for the group and that he was not authorized to act in
such a manner. In essence this disclaimer constituted an admission
that Katz was not licensed as an artists' manager and therefore could
not procure employment.32
In 1966 a dispute arose between the parties, and Katz commenced
proceedings with the American Arbitration Association as provided in
the management agreements.33 The Airplane filed a Petition to Deter-
mine Controversy with the Labor Commissioner essentially alleging
that Katz had acted as an unlicensed artists' manager by procuring en-
gagements or "bookings". 34 They then brought an action against Katz
in Superior Court seeking to enjoin the arbitration on the grounds that
the Labor Commissioner had jurisdiction.35  The motion to restrain
arbitration was denied but this order was later annulled on appeal.36
At the appellate level, Katz objected to the jurisdiction of the La-
bor Commissioner by contending that he did not come under the scope
of the Artists' Managers Act since he was not a licensed artists' man-
ager as was stated in the management agreements. 37 The court held
that the Artists' Managers Act applied not only to licensed artists' man-
agers but also to unlicensed persons acting as artists' managers, as that
term is defined in section 1700.4 of the Act.38 The court went on to
hold that the Artists' Managers Act could not be circumvented by a
provision in the management agreement stating the personal manager
did not intend to act as an artists' manager, if in fact he later acted in
30. 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1967).
31. Id. at 351.
32. Such disclaimer provisions are standard in most personal management agreements.
See Hurewitz, supra note 4, at 58-62; Johnson and Lang, supra note 4, at 419 n.220;
Kronfeld, Margolis and Silfen, supra note 15, at 15, 23-24.
33. Buchwald, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 352 (1967).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 353.
36. Id. at 349, 353.
37. Id. at 354.




As one of many affirmative defenses, Katz asserted that arbitration
of the dispute was proper because the contracts called for arbitration as
permitted under section 1700.45.40 The decision held that if the agree-
ment with Katz was invalid because of non-compliance with the Act,
then no rights, including the right to arbitration, could be derived from
it.4 I Thus, the holding established that Katz was subject to the Act, and
that the Labor Commissioner's initial jurisdiction over controversies
arising under the Act meant, as a practical matter, that personal man-
agers could anticipate the forum of a Labor Commissioner's hearing
when attempting to collect unpaid commissions from artist-clients.
42
This decision was followed by hearings before the Labor Commis-
sioner in June, July and October of 1969. Having determined that Katz
acted as an unlicensed artists' manager in violation of the Act, the La-
bor Commissioner voided his management and publishing agreements
with The Airplane. 43 Katz was then ordered to return all commissions
received (nearly $50,000) and was denied reimbursement for money
spent "in furtherance of the petitioners' musical careers".'
Pursuant to section 1700.44 of the Act, Katz appealed directly to
the superior court.45 The court set a bond to stay execution of the La-
bor Commissioner's monetary award but Katz failed to file the bond
and, as a result, his appeal was dismissed.46 The California Supreme
Court reversed stating that section 1700.44 of the Act did not empower
the superior court to dismiss the appeal for failure to file a bond.4 7 It
held that Buchwald, et al, was free to enforce the Labor Commis-
39. Id. See also CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, R.70 § 1200(b) (1970).
40. Buchwald, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 360 (1967).
41. Id.
42. Generally, such disputes between an artist and manager arise when the personal
manager attempts to collect commissions owed by the artist. See, e.g., Raden v. Laurie, 120
Cal. App. 2d 778, 780, 262 P.2d 61 (1953); Hearings, supra note 10, Statement of Roger
Davis, Esq.
43. Buchwald v. Katz, 8 Cal. 3d 493, 497, 503 P.2d 1376, 105 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1972);
Buchwald v. Katz, No. AMSF 00017 at 2-3 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Feb. 17, 1970). The termina-
tion of all agreements along with all rights thereunder finds it source not in the Act itself but
in the Buchwald v. Superior Court case 254 Cal. App. 2d at 351, 360 and thereafter in the
Labor Commissioner's determinations. Cf. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.46 wherein a very dif-
ferent remedy is provided.
44. Buchwald v. Katz, 8 Cal. 3d 493, 497, 503 P.2d 1376, 105 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1972);
Buchwald v. Katz, No. AMSF 00017 at 2-3 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Feb. 17, 1970). For a similar
holding under the Artists' Managers Act, see, e.g., St. Louis v. Wolf, No. SFMP 57 TAC 29-
79 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Apr. 27, 1981).
45. Buchwald v. Katz, 8 Cal. 3d 493, 497, 503 P.2d 1376, 105 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1972).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 498.
19821
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sioner's award but that Katz's right to appeal remained unaffected. 48
The trial de novo of this case took place in January and February
of 1977. Interestingly enough, two of the five management agreements
and a 1966 publishing agreement between Katz and The Airplane were
voided not because the Act had been violated, but because Katz had
committed fraud and had breached a fiduciary duty owing to The
Airplane.4 9
When deciding cases arising under the Talent Agencies Act, the
Labor Commissioner's office has consistently followed the reasoning
and remedy of its own Buchwald opinion. In McFadden v. Rpp , for
example, Ripp was deemed to have acted unlawfully as an unlicensed
talent agent having secured a recording contract and live engagements
for McFadden. As a result, the management agreement was declared
void, no reimbursement was allowed for out-of-pocket expenses total-
ling $24,000.00, and all monies, commissions and royalties received
were ordered returned to the artist.5"
The same result occurred in the 1981 determination of Sinnamon v.
McKay. 52 As a result of McKay's unlawful procurement of a recording
contract and live engagements for the petitioner, all agreements were
declared null and void, and McKay and his production companies
were ordered to pay Sinnamon "all monies secured directly or indi-
rectly from the sale or marketing of petitioner's artistic endeavors."53
Furthermore, the Commissioner's Office determined that the respon-
dent had "no rights whatsoever" with respect to any claims against the
petitioner which involved business dealings with her as an artist.54
It should be noted that not all of the Commissioner's determina-
tions have been so severe. In Bank of America v. Fleming," a 1982
determination involving the estate of Groucho Marx, the hearing of-
ficer followed a quantum meruit approach by ordering the respondent
to return only those commissions which resulted from services unlaw-
fully performed as an unlicensed artists' manager i:e., she was allowed
to retain monies for services lawfully performed.56 Out of more than
48. Id.
49. Buchwald v. Katz, No. 614 027 (S.F. Super. Ct. May 11, 1977).
50. No. SFMP 71 TAC 7-80 at 6 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r. Dec. 18, 1980).
51. Id. at 8.
52. No. SFMP 73/TAC 9-80 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r. May 8, 1981).
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id.
55. No. 1098 ASC MP-432 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r. Jan. 14, 1982).
56. Id. at 16. For a similar result in the context of contractors who are not licensed as
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$400,000.00 received, Fleming was ordered to return only $80,000.00. 7
During this period, however, there was no guarantee that hearing
officers in the Labor Commissioner's office would consistently use this
quantum meruit approach when dealing with unlicensed personal man-
agers. As can be readily seen from the above determinations, hearing
officers in the Commissioner's office are empowered with broad discre-
tion in formulating remedies under the Act.58 Additionally, officers
were not bound by the holdings of previous determinations, as such
determinations were unpublished and hence of no precedential value.59
Thus, as cases were heard on an ad hoc basis, certainty in the carrying
out of personal management activities became impossible.
V. MAKESHIFT SOLUTIONS AND UNAVAILING LEGAL ARGUMENTS
6 0
Prior to the 1982 amendment of the Talent Agencies Act, the most
obvious way a personal manager could avoid the severe penalties for
unlawful job procurement was simply to become licensed as a talent
agent. The difficulty with this solution is that licensed talent agents are
also subject to union and guild franchise regulations, many of which
restrict the business practices of personal managers.6'
Personal managers generally receive commissions ranging from
10% to 25% of an artist's gross income.62 The maximum commission a
franchised agent may receive, however, is usually 10% depending on
the guild.63 In addition, the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and the Amer-
required under the California Business and Professions Code, see Comet Theatre Enter-
prises v. Cartwright, 195 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1952).
57. Fleming, No. 1098 ASC MP-432, at 16.
58. Garson v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 33 Cal. 2d 861, 864, 206 P.2d 363
(1949). Fleming No. 1098 ASC MP-432 at 15-16. Furthermore, although officers in the
Commissioner's office may be the finders of fact, they are not bound by the rules of evidence
nor the rules ofjudicial procedure. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, R.70 §§ 12031 - 12032 (1970).
59. See generally Notes, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 128 (1977).
60. For the discussion which follows, see generally Hurewitz, supra note 4, at 112-120.
61. Guilds and unions are able to regulate agents by expressly prohibiting members
from conducting business with agents who are not franchised. See, e.g., Screen Actor's
Guild, Agency Regulations, Amended Rule 16(F) (hereafter SAG Rule) §§ II, IV cl G; AF-
TRA Regulations Governing Agents Rule 12(b) (hereafter AFTRA Regulations) § I cl A;
Constitution, By-Laws and Policy of the American Federation of Musicians of the United
States and Canada (Rev'd Sept. 15, 1981) (hereafter AFofM Const.) art. 23, § 5.
62. Shemel and Krasilovsky, supra note 16, at 72. Telephone interview with Pat Mc-
Queeney, the Conference of Personal Managers (Nov. 5, 1982). See also Hurewitz, supra
note 4, at 83.
63. SAG and AFTRA limit the amount of commissions an agent may receive to 10%.
AFTRA Regulations § XX cl B, C; SAG Rule § XI, cl A, B. The AFofM figure, however, is
15% if the duration of the engagement is two or more consecutive days a week or 20% for a
1982]
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ican Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA) specifically
prohibit franchised agents from acting as producers or from being
financially involved with production companies-both of which are ac-
tivities in which some personal managers engage.' In addition, all
three guilds permit an artist (or agent) to terminate the agency agree-
ment if the artist fails to obtain employment within a specified period.65
This requirement seems overly burdensome if one accepts the premise
that procuring employment is incidental to other services performed by
personal managers. Because the guild regulations made licensing
under the Act so undesirable, various strategies and legal arguments
were attempted by personal managers to avoid the Act and the guild
regulations altogether.
A. Contractual Provisions
Two such strategies are found in Buchwald, supra the first being
the disclaimer provision, found in most management agreements, stat-
ing that Katz was not an artists' manager and would not act as such.66
The Buchwald court held that such a contractual provision will not
shield a personal manager from the penalties of the Act if s/he acts as
an unlicensed artists' manager by unlawfully procuring employment.67
The second strategy found in Buchwald was the provision in Katz'
management contracts which called for the private arbitration of dis-
putes. Based on this provision, it was argued that the Labor Commis-
sioner had no jurisdiction to make a determination. Having held that
the management agreement was void due to noncompliance with the
Act, the court ruled that no rights, including the right of arbitration,
could be derived from it.
68
Another considered approach to avoid the jurisdiction of the La-
bor Commissioner was to place a choice of law provision in the per-
single engagement of one day duration. AFofM Const. art. 23, § 8, cl. (a)(i)(ii); AFofM
Exclusive Agent-Musician Agreement, § 4(a); AFofM Booking Agent Agreement (A)(i)(ii)
at 10. The AFofM also allows agent franchisees to receive an additional commission of 5%
for engagements if the agent signs a Personal Management Agreement with a Federation
member. AFofM Const. art. 23, § 8, cl(a)(ii); AFofM Booking Agent Agreement (A)(iii) at
10.
64. SAG Rule § XVI B at 28; AFTRA § VI. Johnson and Lang, supra note 4, at 418;
Hurewitz, supra note 4, at 86.
65. AFofM Const. art. 23, § 9, cl C (i-v); SAG Agency Contract Paragraph 6, AFTRA
Agency Contract Paragraph 6. See also, CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit 8, R.70 § 12001(e).
66. Buchwald, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 354.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 360.
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sonal management agreement.69 Yet even this solution was not fool-
proof. In determining whether a choice of law provision will be
honored, California courts generally consider whether the agreement in
question has a substantial connection with the state whose law the par-
ties have chosen to be controlling. Absent a significant relation, it is
uncertain whether the law of that state would apply.7" In making this
determination, the courts would examine such facts as where the con-
tract was made and the place of principal performance.' Considera-
tion has also been given as to whether the parties conduct business and
maintain an office in California.7 2 A last factor that a court might in-
quire into is whether enforcement of an agreement would violate pub-
lic policy in California. Absent the existence of the above elements, the
effectiveness of a choice of law provision seems tenuous.
Another stop-gap strategy used by personal managers was to re-
frain from taking a commission. The Commissioner's office has con-
sistently held, however, that this would not constitute a mitigating
factor in determining whether the personal manager had acted as an
unlicensed talent agent by unlawfully procuring employment. "The
fact that respondents may not have actually received any moneys, in
connection with their unlawful conduct, does not render that conduct
any more laudatory or less offending."73 Similarly, the fact that the
personal manager only negotiated the terms while others actually pre-
pared the contract did not relieve the manager of liability.74
B. Exclusive Agreements and Use of the Corporate Form
Other, more complex strategems were unsuccessfully used to cir-
cumvent the taint of unlawful procurement. In Sinnamon v. McKay,75
for example, the petitioner entered into an exclusive recording contract
and a publishing agreement with McKay Productions, Inc. rather than
69. Hurewitz, supra note 4 at 119.
70. See generally Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 227 Cal. App. 2d 11, 16, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 376 (1964). In Ury, a loan agreement, which was usurious under California law, was
upheld because of a provision in the agreement which stated that the loan would be con-
strued pursuant to New York law under which it was not usurious. This choice of law
provision was upheld only after a careful analysis of choice of law issues discussed in the
text below. See also Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 867, 583 P.2d 721 (1978).
71. Ury, 227 Cal. App. 2d at 16-17.
72. Id. at 17.
73. McFadden, No. SFMP 71 TAC 7-80 at 7: see also Sinnamon, No. SFMP 73/TAC 9-
80 at 6.
74. Fleming, No. 1098 ASC MP-432 at 13-14.
75. Sinnamon, No. SFMP 73/TAC 9-80.
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a management agreement.76 McKay was not going to produce Sin-
namon's records himself but instead promised to "get her a deal with a
major company."77 McKay contended that this promise as well as the
subsequent procurement of engagements for Sinnamon did not consti-
tute unlawful procurement because Sinnamon was a salaried employee
of McKay, Inc.78 Although Sinnamon was in fact paid $1,000.00 per
month pursuant to the two agreements, this "salary" was deducted
from the income paid to McKay Productions, Inc. by third party record
companies.
79
Upholding substance over form, the Commissioner's office deter-
mined there was no evidence to support a finding that McKay intended
to treat Sinnamon as an employee. The record indicated that no de-
ductions were made from the petitioner's monthly income, she had no
regular hours or supervision and there was no unbridled right to fire
her.8 0 McKay and his production companies were thus found to have
acted as unlicensed talent agents; accordingly, agreements between the
parties were declared void and monies, profits, royalties and commis-
sions received were ordered returned.8" It should be noted that even if
Sinnamon had been an actual employee of McKay's, there is no cer-
tainty this situation would have been lawful as no determination on
this point was made.
Another unsuccessful attempt to avoid the mandates of the Talent
Agencies Act is found in St. Louis v. Wolf. 2 In that case, Wolf tried to
cloak his procurement activity by creating a corporation to do the pro-
curing for him. Having determined that the sole purpose of Wolfhead
Productions, Inc., was to sell petitioner's recordings, the hearing officer
found the corporation in violation of the Act because it did not have an
artists' managers license.83 The corporate veil was then pierced and
Wolf was held personally liable on a theory of alter ego; his personal
accounts and records being indistinguishable from those of the
76. Id. at 2-3.
77. Id. at 2.
78. Id. at 2-6.
79. Id. at 4.
80. Id. at 4, 6;Butsee Edwards v. City of Chico, 28 Cal. App. 3d 148, 153; 104 Cal. Rptr.
481 (1972) in which it was held that the primary test for determining whether an employ-
ment relationship exists is "whether the employer has the right to control and direct the
activities of the alleged employee or the manner or method in which the work is performed."
81. Sinnamon, No. SFMP 73/TAC 9-80 at 8-9.
82. No. SFMP 57 TAC 29-79 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Apr. 27, 1981).
83. Id. at 10-11. Corporations are specifically included in the term "talent agency" as




C The Scope of the Act and the Meaning of Procurement
Next to the makeshift strategies stands the fundamental argument
that the Talent Agencies Act does not apply to personal managers sim-
ply because personal managers are not talent agents. Talent agents are
defined in section 1700.4 of the Act as ". . . a person or corporation
who engages in the occupation of procuring . . . employment."85 If
one accepts the distinction that personal managers do not procure em-
ployment to the same degree as talent agents, then it may be argued
that personal managers do not procure employment within the mean-
ing of the Act.86 The determinations which address this issue are un-
clear, but they seem to suggest that certain acts of job solicitation by
unlicensed personal managers will not constitute unlawful job procure-
ment. Perhaps the best evidence of this is found in the determination
of Kearney v. Singer.87
There the Labor Commissioner terminated the management
agreement based on an analysis of the contract itself. As in Buchwald,
the Kearney agreement contained a disclaimer stating that the manager
was not licensed to "seek or obtain employment."8 The Commissioner
held that this provision turned the contract into a sham when the actual
intent of the parties was considered.89 Intent was ascertained by refer-
ence to riders attached to the agreement. One rider contained a provi-
sion stating that the artist was to refer employment offers to the
manager so that the latter could "further" such offers.90 "Furthering an
offer" as well as "negotiated terms" were deemed to be unlawful pro-
curement whereas "initial overtures" or "preliminary discussions" were
not.9' Aside from this singular example, nowhere in this determination
84. St. Louis, No. SFMP 57 TAC 29-79 at 9.
85. See supra note 3.
86. See Hearings, supra note 10, Statement of Howard Thaler. The argument that per-
sonal managers should be exempt from the Act because they only procure incidentally re-
sembles New York's approach to the situation. Under the New York Employment Agencies
Act, a personal manager does not need a license to seek employment if this is only incidental
to the business of managing. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 171(8) (McKinney 1968). In constru-
ing this statute, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division has undermined its value
by holding that the procurement of a single recording contract will take the personal man-
ager ot of the exemption. Pine v. Laine, 321 N.Y.S.2d 303, 36 A.D.2d 924 (1971).
87. No. MP 429 AM-21 IMC (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Feb. 9, 1978).
88. Id. at 4, see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
89. Id. at 3.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id. at 6, 9; see also Pryor v. Franklin, No. TAC 17 MP 114 at 14-15 (Cal. Lab.
Comm'r Aug. 12, 1982).
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were the above phrases defined or distinguished. Consequently, the de-
termination did little to dispel uncertainty as to what constituted law-
ful, though unlicensed, procurement.
The determination made in Fischer v. Shepard 2 is not much more
helpful on this question. In that matter, the personal manager intro-
duced the artist-petitioner to a casting director who offered the artist a
job.93 The Commissioner, however, determined that the manager did
not act as an artists' manager and therefore the Commissioner lacked
jurisdiction to hear the dispute.9 4 The rationale for this holding was
that although the manager opened the door to the meeting, "it was peti-
tioner and not respondent who seized on the opening to arrange for an
audition and who negotiated the terms of the employment."95 This de-
termination should be compared with the more recent determination in
Pryor v. Franklin96 wherein it was held that "initiating" contacts that
were intended to market Pryor's talents as an artist did constitute un-
lawful procurement.
Finally, in Narramore v. McGuffin , the respondent secured one
engagement for the petitioner. The Commissioner's office found that
there was no evidence that other artists were booked by the respondent
and that this isolated instance was a "transitory violation" which did
not constitute procuring employment.98
In contrast to what does not constitute unlawful procurement by
an unlicensed personal manager, what does constitute unlawful pro-
curement is fairly clear and includes such activities as offers, promises
and attempts to secure employment contracts or "deals" as well as live
engagements or "bookings." 99 Even negotiations and initiating or de-
manding changes in existing employment agreements have been in-
cluded within this pervasive definition."°° Yet, no well-defined (and
accessible) parameters have been established for the concepts of unli-
92. No. AMC 7-78 MP 453 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Jan. 23, 1981).
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id. at 2; see supra note 27.
95. Id. at 5.
96. No. TAC 17 MP 114 at 16 (Cal. Lab. Comm'r Aug. 12, 1982). See also, St. Louis,
SFMP 57 TAC 29-79 at 12 where it was held that "showcasing" i.e., having a musician
perform free to invited guests in the industry, was an act of unlawful procurement because it
was considered an "attempt" to obtain employment in that the end result was to secure a
job.
97. No. SFMP 95 TAC 31/81 at 4. (Cal. Lab. Comm'r. Aug. 17, 1981).
98. Id. at 3-4.
99. Sinnamon, No. SFMP 73/TAC 9-80 at 2-3, 5; St. Louis, No. SFMP 57 TAC 29-79 at
2, 5-6; McFadden, No. SFMP 71 TAC 7-80 at 2-4, 6.
100. Pryor, No. TAC 17 MP 114 at 14-16; Kearney, No. MP 429 AM-211 MC.
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censed, lawful and unlawful procurement as cases are decided on an ad
hoc basis. And, the boundary being so vague, it seems arguable that
almost any act of solicitation can be construed as an "attempt" to pro-
cure employment thereby falling within the statutory definition and
scope of the Act. Finally, even if absolute definitional guidelines were
forthcoming, an enforcement problem remains. For it is simply im-
practical to police a personal manager's activities so as to determine
when he or she has acted as a talent agent by stepping over a defini-
tional boundary and into the realm of unlawful procurement.''
VI. THE 1982 AMENDMENT
The inability of personal managers to comply with the Act or pro-
tect themselves from its penalties, the uncertain manner in which the
Act has been applied to personal managers and the resultant uncer-
tainty in the profession compelled a search for relief at the legislative
level. Consequently in March of 1982, Assembly Bill 997 was intro-
duced and an amended version was signed into law on August 31st as
Chapter 682 of the California Labor Code to be effective January 1,
1983. 102
The new law essentially reiterates the language of section 1700.4 of
the original Act which defines talent agents and then adds: ". . . ex-
cept that the activities of procuring, offering, or promising to procure
recording contracts for an artist or artists shall not of itself subject a
person or corporation to regulation and licensing under this Chap-
ter."' 1 3 The amended section 1700.4 also provides that this addition
will be repealed on January 1, 1985 and replaced with the original lan-
guage of section 1700.4 unless a prior statute deletes or extends that
date. 104
Permitting unlicensed procurement of recording contracts seems
proper, for many of the Labor Commissioner determinations examined
by this author involve procurement by managers in the music indus-
try. ' 5 As a general rule, however, the fact situations underlying these
determinations would have also constituted violations of the amended
Act because engagements as well as recording contracts were pro-
101. Telephone interview with Roger Davis, Esq., The William Morris Agency (March
20, 1982).
102. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.4, 1700.44, 1701-1704 (West 1971 and Cum. Supp. 1983);
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8C (West 1971).
103. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
104. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
105. McFadden, No. SFMP 71 TAC 7-80; Sinnamon, No. SFMP 73/TAC 9-80; St. Louis,
No. SFMP 57 TAC 29-79; Narramore, No. SFMP 95 TAC 31/91.
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cured."o While unlicensed personal managers are permitted to procure
recording contracts, the booking of engagements continues to be pro-
hibited even though managers are still involved in this activity. 0 7 Cer-
tain obvious and practical questions arise here. How is a personal
manager to draw the line, and is it in the best interests of artists that
their managers do so? And, remembering the problems inherent in de-
fining procurement, how does one define a "recording contract"? Is it
still a recording contract if it includes provisions relating to video
rights? And, is the phrase "recording contract" limited to the basic art-
ists' agreement, or will it include soundtrack album agreements, distri-
bution agreements and independent production agreements? Absent a
more precise definition, the meaning of recording contract is likely to
be found in ad hoc, inconsistent determinations as was the case with the
meaning of procurement. Finally, remembering the remedies imposed
under the original Act, will commissions lawfully received from pro-
curement of recording contracts be subject to refund to the artist if the
personal manager is subsequently found to have unlawfully procured
engagements? In short, the relief granted to managers would seem to
be more apparent than real in that only one area is rectified-recording
agreements-and even here, confusion remains.
The new law also restates the language of section 1700.44 of the
original Act pertaining to the determination of controversies by the La-
bor Commissioner and adds: "No action or proceeding may be prose-
cuted under this Chapter with respect to any violation occurring or
alleged to have occurred more than one year prior to commencement
of the action or proceeding."' The one year limitation on bringing an
action under the Act clearly protects personal managers by preventing
artists from blaming them for acts committed years before.
This section further adds, "It shall not be unlawful for a person or
corporation who is not licensed under this Chapter to act in conjunc-
tion with, and at the request of, a duly licensed and franchised talent
agency in the negotiations of an employment contract."' 9 This addi-
tion is also repealed as of January 1985, unless a prior statute deletes or
106. "Engagement" is defined in California Labor Code § 1700.1 as follows:
(a) 'Theatrical engagement' means any engagement or employment of a person
as an actor, performer, or entertainer in a circus, vaudeville, theatrical, or other
entertainment, exhibition, or performance.
(b) 'Motion picture engagement' means any engagement or employment of a per-
son as an actor, actress, director, scenario, or continuity writer, camera man, or in
any capacity concerned with the making of motion pictures.
107. Interview with Roger Shepherd, Avalon Attractions (Oct. 22, 1982).




extends that date, and is replaced by the original language of section
1700.44.' " The language permitting personal managers to work with
talent agents in negotiating contracts in essence makes legal a practice
which has existed for some time."' However, in the event of a contro-
versy, it should be remembered that the personal manager will be obli-
gated to prove that s/he acted at the request of the agent, not just the
client, and consequently the agent's testimony may be crucial. Further-
more, prior determinations having failed to draw a distinction between
"procuring" and "negotiating", there is no reason to feel confident that
the distinction will now become apparent under the new Act. The
amendment, in other words, appears to have failed to address the most
pressing problem under the Act: the uncertainty of its application.
Next, the new amendment repeals section 1700.46 of the Labor
Code which made the violation of the Talent Agencies Act a misde-
meanor, punishable by fine and/or imprisonment. "'
Finally, the amendment adds a new article to the Talent Agencies
Act which provides for the creation of the California Entertainment
Commission composed of licensed talent agents, personal managers,
artists and the Labor Commissioner. It is curious to note that this sec-
tion does not call for guild or union representation on the Commis-
sion. 113 The Commission is required to study the "laws and practices"
of the entertainment capitals in the United States regarding the licens-
ing of agents and "representatives of artists in the entertainment indus-
try in general" so as "to recommend to the Legislature a model bill
regarding this licensing." This section is also effective until January
1985, unless that date is deleted or extended." 4
Although the 1982 amendment absolves personal managers from
liability for certain types of job procurement, the fact remains that the
relief is superficial and temporary. The amendment, however, does
provide members of the industry with the opportunity to work out a
more permanent solution to the situation through the licensing of per-
sonal managers. The motivating force which should bring personal
managers to the bargaining table of the California Entertainment
Commission is the threat of returning to regulation under the original
Talent Agencies Act should the sunset clauses take effect when there is
Il0. Id.
Ill. Telelphone interview with Pat McQueeney, The Conference of Personal Managers
(Oct. 14, 1982).
112. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(5) (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
113. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1701-1703 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
114. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1704 (West Cum. Supp. 1983).
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no alternative licensing scheme for managers. The agents and the
guilds will come to the table because under the amendment, managers
can procure and negotiate, albeit to a limited degree, without any of the
guild restrictions imposed on talent agents for performing similar
functions.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS: THE LICENSING AND REGULATION OF
PERSONAL MANAGERS
Outlining specific proposals for licensing personal managers is dif-
ficult because the functions of managers vary depending upon the
needs of each artist and the particular field of the entertainment indus-
try one is considering. There are, however, several general considera-
tions to keep in mind when formulating such proposals. First, in the
spirit of the Talent Agencies Act, a new licensing statute must be
designed to protect the artist. Second, in light of the inability of per-
sonal managers to comply with the Talent Agencies Act due to the bur-
densome guild regulations, the new statute must preclude liability
under that Act for personal managers who procure employment. Fi-
nally, the licensing scheme for personal managers must not be unfair to
talent agents. If a license to procure employment under a "Personal
Managers Act" permits business practices prohibited under the Talent
Agencies Act and the guild regulations without some sort of counter
balance, then it seems possible that talent agents, performing functions
similar to those of personal managers, will opt for the personal man-
ager's license. Consequently, the talent agent's license and franchise
could conceivably fall into disuse, in which case the traditional restric-
tions upon the business practices of talent agents would begin to erode.
With these considerations in mind, proposals as to the form and
substance of a new licensing statute become somewhat more apparent.
First, managers should be licensed by the state after meeting registra-
tion requirements similar to those which exist for talent agents under
the Talent Agencies Act. Such requirements should be fair and not
overly burdensome for managers to comply with. Second, it has also
been suggested that a licensing law articulate the existence of a fiduci-
ary duty between the personal manager and the artist-client.' 5 This
would help to prevent overreaching and conflicts of interest in situa-
tions where an artist contracts with a publishing or production com-
pany in which the personal manager has a financial interest. It may
115. See generaly Jossen, Fiduciary Aspects of the Personal Manager's Relationship with a
Performing Artist 167 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1980).
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also be a reasonable requirement that such transactions between the
manager and artist client be presumed unlawful unless; (1) the artist
obtains informed advice from a third party, and (2) the manager has
obtained a waiver signed by the client with respect to any given trans-
action. Third, the licensing statute should contain a descriptive defini-
tion of a personal manager, just as talent agents are defined in the
Talent Agencies Act. Along these lines, the Act might also promulgate
specific rules and regulations regarding permissible and unlawful busi-
ness activities.
If a personal manager intends to procure employment in addition
to providing management services, then an additional license should be
required. This license to procure could be subject either to a client's
absolute right of termination or to the client's retention of a licensed
talent agent; in either case the personal manager is pre-empted from
procuring.' 16 In addition, there must be no requirement that the per-
sonal manager procure, and the artist's right to terminate should not be
contingent on the manager's failure to do so. Last, personal managers
who procure might also become guild franchisees and, to the extent
they procure for clients in any given area, would be totally precluded
from conflict relationships in that area.'."
Finally, there remains the issue of whether the Labor Commis-
sioner or the Superior Court is to be given original jurisdiction over
disputes arising under a new Act. It seems preferable that disputes be
resolved directly through the court system rather than through an ad-
ministrative hearing; this would eliminate the need for a trial de novo.
If the Labor Commissioner is given jurisdiction over disputes, then the
Commissioner's determinations should be published so as to serve as
guidelines for the industry as well as to create consistent policies within
the Commissioner's office.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Talent Agencies Act was designed to regulate talent agents so
as to protect those artists seeking employment." 8 Though intended as
116. For example, the personal manager might be allowed to procure recording agree-
ments and book live appearances whereas the procurement of television and motion picture
contracts would be reserved for the talent agent. Those managers who overstep their author-
ity to procure should be denied commissions as to that unlawful procurement only, rather
than be subject to total disgorgement.
117. This is only to say that if a manager procures employment in the recording industry,
for example, then music publishing agreements between the artist and manager should be
prohibited.
118. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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a shield, the Act has become a sword in the hands of some artists who,
with or without good reason, were able to terminate their management
agreements and receive free management services simply by proving
unlawful procurement. The 1982 amendment superficially addresses
this problem by permitting personal managers to engage in some of the
job solicitation practices which they have been unlawfully engaged in
for years.
Nevertheless, the new law does not go far enough; old problems
remain and new ones arise. In essence, the amendment is a placebo for
serious issues involving the proper role of personal managers in rela-
tion to talent agents, and thus a more permanent solution is essential.
Obviously there are no ready answers to the complex problems and
sensitive issues involved. Ultimately, a resolution must be the product
of extensive negotiations and compromises between the chosen few
who will sit on the California Entertainment Commission. The oppor-
tunity to end the personal manager controversy has arrived; whether or
not it bears fruit remains to be seen. For whom the bill toils? With
luck, it toils for all.
Adam B. Nimoy*
* The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance and support of Sheryl
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